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Abstract
Since the 2010s, China’s sports industry has undergone comprehensive reforms.
This paper attempts to understand this change of direction from the central state’s
perspective. By examining the dynamics of the basketball and soccer markets, it
discovers that while the deregulation of basketball is a result of persistent bottom-up
effort from the private sector, the recentralization of soccer is a state-led policy change.
Notwithstanding the different nature and routes between these reforms, in both sectors,
the state’s aim is to restore and strengthen its legitimacy within the society. Amidst
China’s economic stagnation, the regime hopes to identify sectors that can drive
sustainable growth, and to make adjustments to its bureaucracy as a way to respond to the
society’s mounting demand for political modernization.
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Chapter I: Introduction
China was not a well-known sports market in the world until Stephon Marbury’s
success. The two-time NBA All-Star, who suffered from depression after a rift with his
team and fans, quitted the NBA, and rebuilt his life in China.1 After two mediocre
seasons with Shanxi and Foshan, Marbury joined the Beijing Ducks, and helped the team
win three championships within four years. More importantly, he won the heart of the
city. His social media account now has four million followers, and he has a museum
showcasing his basketball career, sitting only five kilometers away from the Tiananmen
Square.2 In April 2016, Zhang Jiandong, the Vice Mayor of Beijing, handed over his
permanent residence card to the basketball star at the City Hall of Beijing, acknowledging
his “significant and extraordinary contribution to China.”3
Among all the drama that the Chinese sports market has seen in recent years,
many are not as positive as the story of Marbury’s. In fact, short-sightedness and
“money-burning” are the more commonplace connotations.4 According to the Mirror,
Chinese Super League (CSL), the top-tier soccer league in China, “set a new spending
record of £331 million in the winter window of 2017,” exceeding the total expenditures

1

Ben Golliver, "Stephon Marbury Admits He Was Depressed, Suicidal at Time of Vaseline
Video," SI.com, January 17, 2015, accessed April 19, 2017,
https://www.si.com/nba/2015/01/17/stephon-marbury-sucidial-depressed-hbo-sports-chinaknicks#.
2
Stephon Marbury, "Stephon Marbury Weibo Bio," Sina Weibo, accessed April 19, 2017,
https://weibo.com/u/1683814612; Marc J. Spears, "Stephon Marbury: Remade in China," The
Undefeated, December 28, 2016, accessed April 20, 2017,
http://theundefeated.com/features/stephon-marbury-re-made-in-china/.
3
Mengjia Hao, "Beijing Municipal Government Confers Resident Card to Marbury," People,
April 18, 2016, accessed April 19, 2017, http://sports.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2016/0418/c2217628285094.html.
4
Xiaobo Wang, "CSL Clubs' Money Burning Shocks the World," iFeng, January 5, 2017,
accessed April 19, 2017, http://news.ifeng.com/a/20170105/50528935_0.shtml.
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of the English Premier League during the same time period.5 The 2016-2017 Chinese
Basketball Association (CBA) champion, Xinjiang Tigers, is estimated to have spent over
100 million yuan (USD 14.3 million) in the past few seasons.6 Not only professional
clubs are throwing money at world’s top players, Chinese sports media and event
sponsors are also increasingly aggressive for business opportunities in the sports arena. In
January 2015, Tencent, China’s Internet giant, secured a five-year broadcasting deal with
the NBA for USD 500 million.7 Months later, another business conglomerate Alibaba
signed as “Presenting Partner of the FIFA Club World Cup.”8 In 2016, another digital
video platform LeSports acquired two year’s exclusive broadcasting rights of Chinese
Super League (CSL) for a record-breaking 2.7 billion yuan (USD 392 million).9 It seems
that all the well-positioned corporations in China have recognized the potential of the
country’s sports market within a few years. The question thus arises: what has led them to
believe in this yet-to-be-mature market?
Several persuasive explanations exist. The first ascribes the rapid market growth
to the rising middle class, arguing that the country’s increased disposable income has
driven consumption in entertainment and sport. Data from the World Bank support this
5

Neil McLeman, "Chinese Super League Winter Transfer Window Closes with Record Spend,"
Mirror, February 28, 2017, accessed April 19, 2017,
http://www.mirror.co.uk/sport/football/news/chinese-super-league-winter-transfer-9937705.
6
Xiao Liu, "Xinjiang Winning Championship Is the Best Outcome of the Money Burning Era."
Lanxiong Sports, April 9, 2017, accessed April 19, 2017,
http://www.lanxiongsports.com/?c=posts&a=view&id=5792.
7
Xiruo Liu, "Tencent Secures 5-year NBA Exclusive Broadcasting Deal at 5 Million
Dollars," The Beijing News, January 31, 2015, accessed April 19, 2017,
http://finance.chinanews.com/it/2015/01-31/7022312.shtml.
8
FIFA, "Alibaba E-Auto Signs as Presenting Partner of the FIFA Club World Cup," news release,
December 9, 2015, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/clubworldcup/news/y=2015/m=12/news=alibabae-auto-signs-as-presenting-partner-of-the-fifa-club-world-cup-2743056.html.
9
"LeSports Acquired 2-year CSL Broadcasting Deal for 2.7 Billion Yuan," Sina Sports, February
23, 2016, accessed April 19, 2017, http://sports.sina.com.cn/china/j/2016-02-23/docifxprucu3152468.shtml.
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argument, showing that China’s GNI per capita rose from USD 940 in 2000 to USD
7,930 in 2015.10 According to the National Statistics Bureau, nearly half of this income
was at people’s own disposal.11 The extra paycheck has allowed the Chinese people to
spend more money on leisure than ever, and its concurrence with the economy’s
slowdown in the past few years even strengthens the sports market growth.12 In fact,
China’s sports consumption market is benefiting from “the lipstick effect,” meaning that
the society now spend less money on big items and resort to cheaper investments to
“cheer themselves up.”13 Since watching and playing sports are much more affordable
than car purchases and vacations abroad, the rising middle class tend to spend more on

10

"GNI per Capita, Atlas Method (current US$) of China," chart, in World Bank Group,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?locations=CN.
11
"2015 National Data," National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China, accessed
April 19, 2017, http://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=C01. According to the National
Statistics Bureau, the disposable income per capita of 2015 is 21,966 yuan (USD 3,189).
12
"China's Economic Slowdown," The Wall Street Journal, August 14, 2016, accessed April 19,
2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-economic-slowdown-1471194066.
13
Larry Elliott, "Into the Red: 'lipstick Effect' Reveals the True Face of the Recession," The
Guardian, December 21, 2008, section goes here, accessed April 19, 2017,
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/dec/22/recession-cosmetics-lipstick.
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these activities now, than during the good times. With a larger population willing to
consume sports-related goods and services, firms have also become more confident in
their decisions to invest in the market.
The second explanation emphasizes the change of social norms. As the world
becomes more interconnected, international sporting events and stories on these events
are also pouring into China, mostly via television and Internet. After insisting on the
superiority of the socialist model for decades, the public started to recognize the
advantages of the Western sports model, and to press for a more market-oriented
approach. The case for deregulation dates back to the 2008 Olympic Games, but this antitotalitarian argument was then repressed by the state.14 Two weeks after the closing of the
Beijing Olympics, many netizens unleashed their skepticisms against juguo tizhi, China’s
totalitarian sports system, during an online chat with an official from the State General
Administration of Sports (SGAS).15 The official avoided straightforward answers to these
questions, but argued that reform would be a gradual process.16 In the following years,
the state became more lenient on criticisms against the system. Commercial media, and
even sports officials, began to openly examine the disadvantages of it.17 In 2012, China’s
basketball legend Yao Ming publicly criticized the elite sports system on the World
Economic Forum (Davos) in Tianjin, which was a globally live streamed event, and did
14

Xiaozheng Xiong, "Juguo Tizhi Might Disintegrate, But Reformation Is a Gradual Process,"
People, September 10, 2008, accessed April 19, 2017,
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/32306/54155/57487/7916008.html.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
"We Look Forward to Gold Medals in Other Arenas," IFeng, August 13, 2012, accessed April
19, 2017, http://news.ifeng.com/opinion/special/jinpai/; Xuelin Jiang, Lingyan Huang, and
Jianshan Zhong, "Director of the Management Center of Gymnastics: Seek New Ways of
Scouting beyond the Totalitarian System," China News, October 9, 2014, accessed April 19, 2017,
http://www.chinanews.com/ty/2014/10-09/6660497.shtml.
9

not encounter any backlash.18 The society completely flipped over the narrative within
years. After the Rio Olympics, in which the Chinese delegation won three less gold
medals than they did in London, and thirteen less than in Beijing, the society did not put
blame on the athletes, but recognized the urgent need to transform China’s sports system
and not to overemphasize gold medals.19 The public’s engagement in the anti-Sovietmodel narrative may have conveyed a message to the corporate sector. The private firms
see the potential opportunities not only in the mass fitness business, but also in
professional sports that would boom after the highly likely deregulation. This belief leads
to massive investments, in order to set the stage for future development in the market.
Although arguments based on the economic and social factors are compelling, this
study primarily focuses on the third explanation to the boom – the state’s leadership in
the sports industry reform. It hypothesizes that the state has played a crucial role to the
recent growth in the sports market by initiating a top-down sports industry reform, and
aims to identify the incentives for this reform. The state embarked on this policy change
in 2014. On October 2, the State Council of China announced its reformation roadmap for
the sports sector – the Opinions on Accelerating the Development of the Sports Industry
and Promoting Sports Consumption. This document, often referred to as the Document
46, specifies that the Chinese sports industry should “exceed 5 trillion yuan (USD 73

18

Danyang Luo, "Yao Ming Pulling an End to the Totalitarian System," Sina, September 12,
2014, accessed April 19, 2017,
http://finance.sina.com.cn/zl/china/20140912/073420274301.shtml.
19
Didi Tang, "In China, 'Happy Gymnastics' Replaces Grind of Strict Study," Associated Press,
July 13, 2016, accessed April 20, 2017,
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/9c7217f0bc554ee08ecd808bdbead535/china-happy-gymnasticsreplaces-grind-strict-study.
10

billion) by the end of 2025,” and “become a crucial force in facilitating sustainable
growth of the economy and the society.”20
Considering the historical background, it was unusual for the State Council to
issue such a detailed reformation plan for sports at this point. First, sports had rarely been
regarded as a driving force for China’s economic growth in the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) era. By 2015, revenues from the sports industry constituted only 0.6% of the
national GDP.21 Compared to the U. S’s 3%, China’s sports industry contributed
minimally to the national economy. Second, the industry’s economic performance in the
past few years was not doomed. From 2000 to 2009, the sports industry had already
undergone substantial growth, partly due to the Olympic Games in Beijing – during this
period, China’s spending on sports increased by 20% annually, 1.6 times faster than its
national GDP growth.22 Besides, the goals that the Document proposes are extremely
ambitious, considering the current standing of the market. According to the National
Statistics Bureau and Credit Suisse’s analysis, the size of China’s sports industry in 2014
was 386.4 billion yuan (USD 56.1 billion), merely 7.7% of the state’s goal of five
trillion.23

20

People's Republic of China, State Council, Opinions on Accelerating the Development of the
Sports Industry and Stimulating Sports Consumption, October 20, 2014, Developmental
Suggestions, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-10/20/content_9152.htm.
21
David Hao, Dick Wei, and Evan Zhou, China Media Entertainment Sector - Credit Suisse
Securities Research and Analytics, report, September 25, 2015, China Sports: The Rise of Mass
Fitness.
22
The Sports Market: Major Trends and Challenges in an Industry Full of Passion ATKearney, report, 2011, https://www.atkearney.com/documents/10192/6f46b880-f8d1-49099960-cc605bb1ff34.
23
Hao, Wei, and Zhou, China Media Entertainment Sector - Credit Suisse Securities Research
and Analytics; "National Data." National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China.
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However, the release of Document 46 illuminates the changing mindset of the
state, with regards to how it can take advantage of the development of sports. Since the
establishment of the CCP regime, Chinese athletes have been serving the socialist system
by winning medals in international competitions, particularly in the Olympic Games. By
2014, the National Statistics Bureau still listed the numbers of world championships, elite
athletes, and coaches as indicators of national sports development, whereas the economic
aspect of the industry was not included in its statistics.24 By issuing Document 46, the
state abandoned this communist way of thinking and took a market-oriented approach. In
fact, Document 46 does not even touch on topics such as “gold medals,” “championships,”
or even “the Olympic Games” that have been prevalent in previous propaganda.25 By
contrast, it calls for deregulation, innovation, engagement of the social forces, structural
improvement, and growth from the mass fitness sector.26
The announcement of Document 46 marks China’s state-led effort to disintegrate
and commercialize its deeply rooted totalitarian sports system. This study examines the
driving forces for this policy change and how the policy has, so far, affected the sports
sector. Specifically, it delves into two cases: basketball and soccer. Both sports are
popular among the masses, and designated as the “beginning point” for the deepening of
the reform.27 To better understand the dynamics of these changing markets, this paper
breaks down the market into different actors: the state, local governments, the
bureaucracy, and the private sector. It analyzes each actor’s actions and their impact on
“2014 National Data – Indicators – Sports,” National Bureau of Statistics of People’s Republic
of China.
25
People’s Republic of China, State Council, Opinions on Accelerating the Development of the
Sports Industry and Promoting Sports Consumption.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
24
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the reform. While the central state is our major research interest, a disassembly of these
actors can shed light on how the state’s policies have influenced the market’s decisions,
and to which direction has these policies led the sports sector in practice.
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Chapter II: Literature Review
Of the abundant resources on China’s state policies on sport, most have focused
on Beijing and its Olympics frenzy. Nowadays, while the Olympic Games still plays a
vivid role in China’s overall sports policy, professional and mass sports have also come
into play. The Chinese government has endeavored to increase private investment and
mass participation in sports in recent years, and this action needs to be examined in
greater detail. To better understand Beijing’s intention, this chapter reviews literature
from a wider range of topics, including sports policy and societal changes, sport reforms
in post-communist states, and sport policies and regimes, in addition to the long-beendiscussed Olympic medal fever.

Sports and Authoritarian Regimes
Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, sports policy has
always served political purposes and has thus often paralleled with more far-reaching
transitions within the Chinese society. Fan Wei, Fan Hong and Lu Zhouxiang reflect on
the trajectory of CCP’s sports policies since the 1920s.28 Even before 1949, communists
promoted sports exercises as a part of their political campaign.29 The Red Army fighting
in the mountainous areas of Jiangxi initiated the Red Sports Movement (RSM) in schools,
factories, and the military in the 1920s, and expanded it to the New Sports Movement in

28

Fan Wei, Fan Hong, and Lu Zhouxiang, "Chinese State Sports Policy: Pre- and Post-Beijing
2008," The International Journal of the History of Sport 27, no. 14-15 (2010),
doi:10.1080/09523367.2010.504583.
29
Ibid, 2381.
14

1936, when the regime established itself in the city of Yan’an.30 The CCP, during this
period, targeted at the masses and aimed to “train a fit, obedient, and disciplined
workforce.”31 After winning the civil war in 1949, the Party began its Sovietization of the
sports system. Following the “Two Chinas” issue with the International Olympic
Committee (IOC) in 1952, Beijing realized the importance of China’s sports performance
to the regime’s prestige internationally.32 The Party leaders built a Soviet-style structure,
with a Sports Ministry to organize provincial and local sports, organized quadrennial
National Games, and shifted its focus from mass sports to elite training programs.33 After
the Great Leap Forward and the Great Famine in early 1960s, the government further
retracted the number of government-funded athletes to a more elitist base, because the
state’s financial and food shortage were becoming concerning.34 During the Cultural
Revolution between 1966 and 1976, the CCP realized sports was a valuable diplomatic
tool and reestablished formal bilateral relations with the United States with its famous
“ping-pong diplomacy.”35 The regime started to give a breathing space to
commercialization and globalization in the 1980s, as the “reform and opening-up”
campaign took place in the entire country. Central and local governments have given
fiscal rewards to Olympic medalists since then. Meanwhile, research centers were
established to seek enhancement of the elites’ athletic performance. Since the 1990s, the
CCP has advocated for the “National Fitness Programme (NFP),” along with its long-

30

Ibid.
Ibid, 2398.
32
Ibid, 2382.
33
Ibid, 2383.
34
Ibid, 2386.
35
Ibid, 2388.
31
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existing “Olympic Strategy.”36 However, the regime’s enthusiasm for hosting the
Olympic Games and its two bids in 1993 and 2001 demonstrated that the focus was still
on elite sports.37 The authors believed that the resources allocated to top athletes would
still be sufficient after the 2008 Olympic Games, and that elite sports would continue to
play a leading role in the government’s sports policies in the coming years.38
Many scholars believe that the rise of an urban middle class and decentralization
of the national economy are the most important reasons for the recent transitions in
China’s sports sector. Huan Xiong argues that the urbanization process has transformed
China’s sports culture from the grassroot level.39 While the government still holds firm
control on elite sports, the rise of the urban class has created a demand for facilities and
state policies that can accommodate the need of mass sports.40 Similarly, Zhang Jie points
out that China’s sports industry has transitioned from an arena of public welfare before
the “reform and opening-up” to an increasingly mature market nowadays.41 Although the
central government had not taken definite positions on sports market reforms until 2014,
Eleni Theodoraki argues that the commercialization has taken place since the 1990s, with
financial rewards given to the elite athletes and commercial sponsorship that the

36

Ibid, 2389.
Ibid.
38
Ibid, 2398.
39
Huan Xiong, "The Evolution of Urban Society and Social Changes in Sports Participation at
the Grassroots in China," International Review for the Sociology of Sport 42, no. 4 (2007),
doi:10.1177/1012690208089836.
40
Ibid.
41
Jie Zhang (2015) Reality and Dilemma: The Development of China's Sports Industry since the
Implementation of the Reform and Opening-Up Policy, The International Journal of the History
of Sport, 32:8, 1085-1097, DOI: 10.1080/09523367.2015.1022720.
37
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individual sport federations accepted.42 Despite imbalances between sports and regions,
the federations had become more independent from the central government, and the
rewards have provided a capitalist incentive, which is distinct from pure patriotism, to
elite athletes, coaches, and trainers.43
Others state that socio-political reasons are the determining factor behind the
state’s enthusiasm for sports. Xu Guoqi in his book, Olympic Dreams: China and Sports,
1895-2008, recognizes that the Chinese people have collectively carved out a modern
national identity and washed off the “sick man of East Asia” label with the state’s
successes in the Olympics. Xu goes further and speculates about a sports revolution, in
which people across social classes can unleash their anger, anxiety, and social injustice in
China together.44 Fan and Lu (2012) also attribute the state’s and the public’s conjoint
Olympic medal fever to the rise of nationalism following traumatic experience with
Western imperialist powers and Japan.45 Despite the fact that “reform and opening-up”
has allowed private sector to enter the game, the main purpose of commercialization in
the sports system is still to secure necessary funding for the politically significant elite
sports.46
Scholarly works on post-communist sports sector reforms exhibit a few
distinctions amid many similarities to that in China today. According to James Riordan,
42

Eleni Theodoraki (2004) Sport management reform, national competitiveness and Olympic
glory in the People's Republic of China, Managing Leisure, 9:4, 193-211, DOI:
10.1080/1360671042000317289.
43
Ibid.
44
Guoqi Xu and William C. Kirby, Olympic Dreams: China and Sports, 1895-2008 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2009).
45
Hong Fan and Zhouxiang Lu, "From Barcelona to Athens (1992-2004): "Juguo Tizhi" and
China's Quest for Global Power and Olympic Glory," The International Journal of the History of
Sport 29, no. 1 (2012): 113-131, doi:10.1080/09523367.2012.634987.
46
Ibid.
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after the USSR collapsed, many well-known Soviet athletes turned their back to the
Soviet regime and its sports system they used to praise frequently.47 There was also a
“brain” and “muscle drain” after the political transition, as athletes and coaches rushed to
richer Western countries that were interested in recruiting and training high-performance
athletes.48 Sandrine Poupaux examined the course of the former Soviet bloc’s sports
reform. According to Poupaux, China, in the 1980s, was the first among socialist
countries to open up to leisure sports that cost money to practice, and the Soviet Union
and other socialist countries followed in 1985 to restructure their sports system.49 The
economic hardship of the Eastern bloc in the late 1980s led to reduced funding in elite
sports, and the Soviet government had to strive for a balance between spending and
sports participation – they ended up selling athletes to the Western European and North
American countries while encouraging private investments in sport clubs.50 In the 1990s,
the collapse of the USSR was accompanied by more difficult economic transitions and
the dissolution of the Soviet sports system.51 The government eventually retreated from
the sports scene, and sports in the post-soviet countries became closer to the Western
model.52
Comparatively, the reform in China is destined to be more gradual, as there has
been no regime change that will allow athletes to openly criticize the political leaders and

47

Jim Riordan, "The Rise and Fall of Soviet Olympic Champions," OLYMPIKA: The
International Journal of Olympic Studies 2 (1993): 40, accessed April 19, 2017,
http://library.la84.org/SportsLibrary/Olympika/Olympika_1993/olympika0201c.pdf.
48
Ibid.
49
Sandrine Poupaux, "Soviet and Post-Soviet Sport," in Handbook on the Economics of
Sport (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2009), 316-324.
50
Ibid
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid.
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the sports system. In addition, while there had been elite Chinese athletes, mostly table
tennis players and divers, emigrating to Western countries for many years, less elites take
this option nowadays, since playing sports within China has become much more
profitable. To the CCP, conducting privatization reforms at this point would not
necessarily risk the country’s performance significantly in the Olympic Games. Moreover,
the Soviet government, when allowing privatization of the sports sector, was less
voluntary than the Chinese government today, which has a better financial standing and
more authority within the society.
With regards to sports and the regime, Victor Cha proposes the notion of “cocktail
of history, sport and politics,” arguing that sport is more political in Asia than in rest of
the world, due to scarcity of mega sporting events, historical resentment toward
imperialist powers, and the region’s fast pace of development.53 The CCP regime, while
gaining the prestige and influence it had wanted for hosting the Olympic Games, has also
made reluctant policy changes, such as its softened position on South Sudan, under
mounting international pressure.54 James Riordan lists a number of factors, including
nation-building, ethnic and regional integration, defense, health of population, social
policies, international prestige, and foreign policy, that have made sport crucial to
communist regimes.55 Riordan believes that the process of nation-building, associated
with the centralized sports system, is more important than the communist ideology itself

53

Victor D. Cha, "Winning Is Not Enough: Sport and Politics in East Asia and Beyond," The
International Journal of the History of Sport 30, no. 11 (2013),
doi:10.1080/09523367.2013.793177.
54
Ibid.
55
James Riordan, "The Impact of Communism on Sport," in International Politics of Sport in the
Twentieth Century (TAYLOR & FRANCIS, 2016), 48.
19

to motivating patriotism in socialist countries.56 He also illustrates the advantages of the
socialist sports system and potential risks once it dissolves – for example, female athletes
and ethnic minorities have better chance to thrive under the Soviet system than in the
supposedly more advanced Western European countries.57 Although the social changes
and reform trajectory that China is currently going through today differ from the
experience of most post-soviet states, the precedents have shed light on the feasible
pathways to successful sports system reform and the upcoming consequences.
Arthur Johnson categorizes domestic sport policies into integrative, symbolic, and
instrumental, and identifies strategies by which opposition would attack these policies.58
Johnson states that integrative policy manipulates people’s value systems by openly
promoting sportsmanship, symbolic policy requires massive government subsidies and
aims at image building, and instrumental policy rebalances benefits distributed among
participants within the sport system.59 In each of the three regimes, government designs
its policies based on values of the society, while opposition navigates themselves to
exploit sport, particularly by attacking the symbolic policies, to generate support. While
Johnson’s analysis primarily focuses on democratic regimes, the result is enlightening to
the discussion on Beijing’s rationale forming its new sports policies and on the informal
oppositional forces against the old system.

56

Ibid.
Ibid.
58
A. T. Johnson, "Government, Opposition and Sport: The Role of Domestic Sports Policy in
Generating Political Support," Journal of Sport & Social Issues 6, no. 2 (1982),
doi:10.1177/019372358200600203.
59
Ibid.
57
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Chapter III: Commercialization of the Professional Basketball Market
At the 2019 FIBA World Cup bidding presentation, Zhang Jiandong, the Vice Mayor
of Beijing, claimed that “At least 300 million people play basketball in China, and if we
can host the 2019 FIBA Basketball World Cup, we will see an even higher
participation.”60 While Zhang might have exaggerated the number, there is little doubt
that basketball is one of the most watched and participated in sports in the country. The
game’s popularity has led many to believe that once the market is fully commercialized,
it will quickly contribute significant growth to the national sports economy. This chapter
primarily focuses on China’s professional basketball market, in which heated discussion
regarding whether the market should privatize has existed for over a decade. Early in
2004, Li Yuanwei, former Director of the Management Center of Basketball (MCB),
realized the necessity to accelerate commercialization of the Chinese basketball leagues,
and took substantial steps in this direction during his two terms at the MCB.61 However,
after Li’s retirement, his successor, Xin Lancheng, was reluctant to continue the reforms,
because they were at odds with his personal interest. The deregulation in the basketball
market did not restart until the end of the Olympic Games in 2016, nearly two years after
the release of Document 46. By then, the central government could no longer resist
pressure from the private sector and the general public for a departure from the old
soviet-style system.
In this decades-long struggle, the private sector has been steadily increasing its
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influence on public opinion and the central government, whereas the bureaucracy has not
only lost its authority, but also become less valued and trusted by the central state. After
the 2016 Rio Olympics, the state took the pressure of the national team’s performance off
shoulder, and eventually sided with the private sector to facilitate market reforms.

Private Sector on the Rise: the “Gold Rush”
Basketball’s enormous fan base in China makes the sport so lucrative that the private
sector endeavors to tap into every sub-sector of it. On the one hand, direct rivalries within
the same category compete aggressively for the scarce profitable resources, such media
and sponsorship rights of top professional leagues; on the other hand, these private
businesses connect with each other and work as a group against the state’s monopoly.
Such examples can be observed as China’s emerging technology firms have gradually
outperformed the state and provincial media, and as team investors and league sponsors
have steadily gained more influence in the market. The private sector’s financial
capability and profit-oriented strategy have appeal to the general public and to the state.
Alliance with these actors have given the private sector momentum in their battle with the
conservative bureaucracy.
With globalization and the development of technology, digital media is one of the
first arena that Chinese private firms have tapped into, and they have quickly become
competitive with the state media. Three decades after the “open and reform” policy,
China’s private sector has built greater financial capacity to contest the state-owned
enterprises. In 2014, China’s Internet giant Tencent signed a broadcasting deal with the
NBA for USD 500 million, securing exclusive digital rights of all NBA games in China
22

for five years.62 While the deal is smaller than the ESPN-TNT partnership in the United
States, it more than quintupled all previous NBA broadcasting deals in China.63 When
former NBA Commissioner David Stern brought free NBA game video tapes to cater to
China’s state media, CCTV, in 1986, no one would have imagined this league could
achieve success in the world’s largest country today.64 For decades, the NBA league
yielded its broadcasting rights to CCTV at discounted rates, sacrificing short-term
financial gains for the sake of market development in China. Its strategy proved to be
successful, since the NBA has gained great coverage and popularity in China, as CCTV’s
sports channel has been broadcasting a few games per week for free. The media rights
negotiation in 2014 not only allowed the NBA to reap the benefits, but foreshadowed the
collapse of CCTV’s enduring monopoly on sporting events. Before the emergence of
private digital media, CCTV generated tremendous revenue from advertisers in game
broadcasts, since it faced virtually no competition. Although the state has not eased its
restrictions on private television channels, digital media has emerged, able to provide
high quality broadcasting services and participate in a freer market competition for media
rights deals. Unlike the state media that is obliged to serve the public for free, the private
platforms are entitled to provide paid services for consumers, and they can generate
income from businesses as well as subscribers. According to an industry insider, Tencent
has ensured “eight figures (in Chinese yuan)” from NBA subscriptions, advertisements,
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and sponsorships in its first year of partnership with the league.65 Although the specifics
of NBA’s current television deal with CCTV and the television’s earning from it has not
been disclosed, the amount that CCTV has paid can hardly exceed the digital deal,
considering the higher competition level in the digital media market. While the
advertisers may still be willing to invest more on television advertisements at this point,
the gap will diminish as consumers become more used to the digital platforms.
Furthermore, services that the private media platforms provide are more tailored to
customers’ demand, while the state media often prioritizes political objectives. Non-state
service providers have greater incentives to invest in research and development, which
can improve user experience and, thus, maximize its profits. As an Internet platform,
Tencent has invested tens of millions to upgrade their studio and signal transmission
equipment since 2014.66 These upgrades have allowed it to broadcast multiple games
simultaneously, and at high quality. As a result, the platform can accommodate fans of
each team and tailor its programs to different tastes. By contrast, CCTV can broadcast no
more than two NBA games per day, not to mention its timetable is often subject to
change for political purposes. For example, the channel once delayed an important NBA
game to live stream a Chinese Dragon Boat Contest, which would supposedly promote
awareness of Chinese traditional culture.67 Similarly, a taped game of China’s Women’s
National Volleyball team interrupted the final seconds of a live NBA playoff game, and
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the Winter Olympics replaced a Champions League soccer match, despite the latter
would attract considerably greater viewership.68 Besides, Tencent quickly developed and
improved its IOS and Android applications after it secured the broadcasting deal. These
upgrades were made to ensure quality live streams for the company’s paid customers on
mobile devices. Since most NBA games take place in the morning per China time, these
applications have great appeals to the basketball fans, who are predominantly young
professionals and students. While CCTV was one of the first Chinese media platforms to
have developed a digital broadcasting branch, the quality of its programs has barely
improved over the years.
While private firms have brought innovative technology and quality services to the
basketball market, the promising business has also drawn capable investors from other
industries, and put the industry’s traditional players under risk. Anticipating the state to
endorse the sports industry in the coming years, private companies that used to focus on
other industries rush into the field. The Wanda Group, one of China’s largest real estate
and cinema chain operating company, has become a big player in the basketball market in
the past two years. In February 2015, Wanda confirmed acquisition of 68% shares of in
Infront Sports & Media for €10.5 billion (USD 11.2 billion).69 The Swiss sports
marketing and event operation corporation possesses the marketing and media rights of
China’s national basketball teams and the business operation rights of the Chinese
Basketball Association (CBA) League. These assets are among the key factors to
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Wanda’s acquisition, in addition to Infront’s rights to many other top-tier sporting events
in the world.70 Shortly after the acquisition, Wanda inked a long-term strategic
partnership deal with FIBA, which would cover the 2019 Basketball World Cup to be
held in China.71
While Tencent, Wanda and other multi-industry conglomerates have a diversified
portfolio to buffer risks in the basketball market, it is more difficult for the traditional
players to keep up with the game. Li-Ning, a Chinese sports manufacturer and the CBA’s
current exclusive apparel partner, paid 2 billion yuan (USD 298 million) for a five-year
deal in 2012, while its annual revenue at the time was merely USD 972 million.72 The
company’s gamble resulted in a 1.6 billion yuan (USD 233 million) operating deficits, a
260.7% debt-to equity ratio, and a liquidity crisis within one year.73 According to the
Financial Times, Li-Ning had a net loss of USD 94 million in the first half of 2015, and
the USD 59 million sponsorship fee, which is due to the CBA annually, greatly
contributed to this crisis.74 The company did not recover until 2016, when its net income
reached USD 16.9 million. Although the number was still lower than its direct
competitors, it was a notable improvement from three consecutive years of net losses.75
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Despite the financial hardship that the CBA sponsorship imposed on the company, LiNing has, nevertheless, benefited from an improved brand image and expanded market.
According to a recent study, while Li-Ning’s sponsor status in the 2013-2014 CBA
season did not boost immediate CBA-related merchandising sales, it did lead people to
think that “Li-Ning in general is a good company.”76 With one year left in Li-Ning’s
sponsorship contract, it is still uncertain whether sponsoring the CBA has been a wise
decision for the corporation.
While private firms have been able to engage in the media and marketing fields, the
state has been controlling the professional leagues since the 1990s. China has a legacy of
totalitarian sports system (juguo tizhi) that was imported from the Soviet Union in the
1950s. While the society has mostly adopted market reforms in the past thirty years, the
sports institutions have fallen behind in the transition. Till this day, most China’s elite
basketball players are still attached to provincial sport bureaus, which provide funding for
their early years of development and after-retirement rearrangements. Many franchises in
the professional sports leagues receive different forms of financial and policy support
from the provincial or municipal governments. Moreover, the CBA league, which was
organized, invested in, and promoted by the state has been a public property. Ultimately,
the goal of the current CBA league is not to make profits, but to entertain the Chinese
sports fans, to prepare Chinese players for international competitions, and to subsidize
women’s basketball and youth development, which are less profitable but as politically
important as the men’s league.
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However, the private actors have seen the business potential in professional
basketball, and have long been pressing for privatization of the league. Since the CBA
transitioned from an inter-provincial basketball competition to a “professional” basketball
league in 1995, to whom the league’s business operation rights belongs has been a
heatedly discussed issue. In 1997, seven CBA clubs formed a “Professional Basketball
League Organizing Committee (PBLOC)” without the participation of the MCB, aiming
to initiate a bottom-up revolution to privatize the CBA league.77 However, the SGAS
strongly opposed the proposal, criticizing it as “a meeting of no organization and no
discipline that surpassed legal entitlements of clubs.”78 Under mounting political pressure,
PBLOC dissolved in months. In 2005, Beijing and Shanghai led the second bottom-up
attempt to facilitate reform.79 They submitted a business operation proposal that would
yield the league’s decision making power to the clubs to Li Yuanwei, the former Director
of the MCB and a well-known liberal reformist within the state apparatus.80 Li, again,
declined the clubs’ appeal, because the new season was about to begin.81 Although the
bureaucracy did not immediately accept the proposal, it did not openly denounce the
privatization ideals like it did in 1997.82 On the contrary, the meeting opened up bilateral
conversations, and Li Yuanwei has chosen to take sides with the reformists since then.
The most well-organized and promising club-led endeavor took place in
December 2015, when Yao Ming, China’s basketball legend and Shanghai Sharks’ owner,
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summoned eighteen of the twenty CBA clubs to press the MCB for eventually privatizing
the operation rights of the league. This club union soon founded the Zhongzhilian
(Chinese Professional Basketball Association) Company in 2016.83 Yao managed to
engage the MCB into several rounds of negotiations with his personal influence, but these
negotiations all ended up futile, owing to the passive attitudes of the officials.84 Moreover,
only three days after Zhongzhilian was founded, the basketball federation announced its
decision to establish a federation-led CBA Company, and claimed it would grant the
operation rights of the league to this company.85 Yao publicly accused the MCB of
“sustaining the old system under a new name,” as it insists on “retaining the federation’s
rights to leadership, operation, and management” in the new company.86
Despite all the failed attempts to privatize league operations, the private actors
have, nonetheless, navigated through the political barriers and gained greater influence in
the CBA in other ways. First, to tap future opportunities in the market, private investors
have deviated their capital to the franchises instead of the league. Throughout the two
decades of CBA’s history, most teams have made the transitions from provincial or
military ownerships to capitalist ownership structures. In the 1995 CBA season, three of
the eight teams – Beijing, Jilin, and Liaoning – were affiliated with provincial-level
governments, four – Bayi (the Army), Jinan Theater Command, Nanjing Theater
Command, and Guangzhou Theater Command – were attached to the military, and the
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other one – the Pioneers – was composed of policemen.87 However, by 2016, local
governments only had shares in four of the twenty clubs – Liaoning, Bayi (the Army),
Zhejiang Chouzhou Bank, and Jiangsu Kentier.88 All other sixteen franchises either had
private ownerships or mixed ownership with the participation of local state-owned
enterprises (SOEs).89 Furthermore, according to the Sports Money, three teams have filed
for IPO in China’s newly established National Equities Exchange and Quotation (NEEQ)
stock market for mid-level and small-scale corporations.90 Within years, other club
owners may follow this trend and seek to finance their businesses, taking advantage of
the stock market.
Second, the rise of market forces has urged the state actors to conform to the laws
and rules of the business world, rather than imposing regulations on non-state actors at its
will. In 2004, the federation and its associated puppet corporation signed a multi-year
sponsorship contract with ANTA, to avoid bankruptcy.91 Because the federation
appreciated the sponsorship, it used executive orders to force all clubs and players to use
ANTA’s apparels exclusively, although it was not entitled to do so. However, during the
2016-2017 season, when the federation and its agent, Infront, breached their contract with
TAG Heuer, the Swiss watch manufacturer filed a lawsuit against them, and won within a
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year.92
In short, since the first professional basketball league was established in 1995,
private companies have seen enormous potential in this market and have enthusiastically
participated in the competition, with other market forces and the administrative body. On
the one hand, the engagement of the private sector has driven considerable growth, and
challenged the state monopoly over the market. Because of the emergence of privately
funded media, investors, and sponsors, the state apparatuses have become obligated to
diversify their political-oriented contents, build up their financial strengths, and conform
to laws and regulations, in order to remain relevant in the increasingly competitive
basketball market. On the other hand, the private capital can often be blind in this rush for
gold. China’s professional basketball market, like all other budding industries, faces
volatility and unpredictability, accompanied with problems that are more unique to the
country, such as cut throat competition and weak rule of law. Regional inequalities also
rise: several teams have chosen to relocate to the more economically advanced East Coast
in recent years, generating more opportunities in the East and left the Central and
Western China further left behind. One of the most economically liberal province,
Guangdong, now hosts three teams, and Beijing, Shandong, Jiangsu and Zhejiang each
host two. Twenty provinces and autonomous regions do not have any professional
basketball teams at this point.
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The Bureaucracy and Local: Conflicting Ideals from Within
In the case of China’s professional basketball market, the direct regulators are the
MCB, which is a department of the GAS, and MCB’s puppet “non-governmental”
organization – the Chinese Basketball Association (federation). Meanwhile, many of the
professional basketball teams still have direct or indirect linkages to local sport bureaus,
which are both subsidiaries of the GAS and branches of the provincial or municipal
governments. As a result of this parallel leadership structure, mid-level bureaucrats often
find their goals contradictory from within. Owing to the communist legacy, Chinese
sports officials are obligated to both glorify the region with satisfying sports performance,
and, sometimes, enhance the economic growth of the region under their jurisdiction.
However, these two sets of goals are inherently self-contradictory. While the economic
development objectives welcome market-driven growth, the political agendas discourage
large-scale deregulation.
In fact, sports bureaucrats more often opt to pursue the latter, considering the
lower risk of preserving the status quo than of introducing changes. Xin Lancheng, the
current Director of the MCB, is a quintessential conservative bureaucrat that has been
consistently blocking proposals to reform the basketball market. In 1998, as the Director
of the MCB, Xin declined the olive branch extended by the seven clubs that founded the
Professional Basketball League Organizing Committee and warned other clubs not to join
the organization.93 When the clubs showed more collectiveness and determination to
challenge the current system in 2015, Xin fought back even more tenaciously by
accelerating the establishment of the countering CBA Company within days. Xin and the
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MCB triumphed and launched the company on November 22, 2016, and all twenty clubs
attended the press conference held by the federation.
Opposing the privatization of the CBA league, Xin Lancheng has several
reasonable concerns as the top leader of the MCB. First, a commercialized CBA poses
great risks to Xin’s political career. The MCB manages and funds all professional
basketball leagues and all national level teams, including the women’s and youth’s
leagues and teams. Since these entities appear to be less tempting to sponsors than the
CBA, the federation has to manipulate the earnings of the men’s league to subsidize them.
While women’s basketball is less profitable, China’s women’s national team has been
outperforming the men’s in the Olympics and World Championships for decades. Since
the teams of both genders carry equal weight when assessing the officials’ job
performance, Xin and his colleagues will rather retain the resources at their hands to
preserve the prestige of the women’s team and league than simply give in to the private
firms that will solely focus on the more profitable men’s basketball.
Ultimately, medals weigh more than market growth when it comes to the
assessment of China’s sports officials by their supervisors. As an example, Cai Zhenhua,
the former Head Coach of China’s National Table Tennis team who led the team to win
all gold medals in the 2000 Sydney Olympics, was quickly elevated to the Deputy Head
of the GAS, a post equivalent to any vice minister of the state, within seven years since
his retirement from the national team.94 In contrast, several directors of the Management
Center of Football (MCF), which has introduced privatization and stimulated enormous
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economic growth over the past twenty years, were either prosecuted over charges of
corruption or suffered overwhelming attacks from Chinese society, due to the national
team’s unsatisfactory performance.95 Although China’s national basketball teams may not
be able to win gold medals in the foreseeable future, whether they make progress in the
international competitions is still the primary factor that has determined the state’s
evaluation of the basketball-related officials.
Second, the MCB, like many other segments within the Chinese government,
emphasizes stability over timely reforms. In an interview with Tencent in 2009, Xin
admitted that he was reversing some of the liberalization measures. “I am fine with the
words ‘reversal’ or ‘restoration,’ but the league cannot stand any overturning problem.”96
With Xin’s risk-averse ideology, the MCB has initiated a pilot privatization program in
the National Basketball League (NBL), formerly the League B, as an experiment for the
CBA. Although the privatization experiment of the NBL has been welcomed by most
team owners so far, the MCB still consider it too risky to immediately apply to the CBA.
While resistance from the MCB poses a challenge to all CBA teams that seek to
facilitate market reforms, local governments and sport bureaus bind the hands of some
while providing support for the others. Unlike the sport system officials whose
performance are evaluated based on the medal boards, most bureaucrats in provincial and
municipal governments see economic performance as the main driver for promotions and
rewards. Therefore, they often enthusiastically endorse the development of professional
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basketball and their local teams, which can create job opportunities, infrastructure
projects, consumption, and other drivers for economic growth. According to NetEase’s
investigation, subsidies from local governments and local state-owned enterprises have
become a major part of clubs’ income.97 Beijing and Liaoning receive USD 3 million and
USD 1.5 million government subsidies every year, respectively.98 Other local
governments also provide hundreds of thousands of dollars for their teams.
Although most CBA teams contribute to the growth of related industries, whether
the local governments support the team and even the league to privatize differs from case
to case. In the wealthier regions, teams are more likely to be self-sustainable, and the
local governments often endorse marketization, so that the teams can retain its earnings
rather than sharing it with other teams within the league. Beijing Ducks’ recent success
has been an exemplary model that many cities seek but are not able to follow. After
signing the NBA marquee player Stephon Marbury in 2011, the team has won three
championships in the past five years. Because of these accomplishments and Marbury’s
celebrity effect, Beijing has become one of the few CBA clubs that is making a profit.99
Spectators fill the NBA-standard arena, willing to pay USD 15 to 400 for the
entertainment, and even more for the team’s merchandises. Moreover, the success of the
Beijing Ducks has given rise to hundreds of youth basketball training camps, a handful of
basketball theme parks, and a thriving business circles surrounding the team’s home court.
Should the team entitled to its own courtside advertising boards and various sponsorship
rights, it could have profited a lot more than it now receives from Infront, which is
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essentially one twentieth of the totalized sponsorship revenues after deduction of
Infront’s earnings and funds devoted to women’s and youth’s basketball.100 Because of
this calculation, the Beijing Ducks has been advocating for market reforms, although it is
one of the few franchises attached to state-owned enterprises.
By contrast, teams that are not yet able to generate profit by themselves and are
dependent on local governments for funding and resources have obligations to the local
government. In some cases, local governments view these local teams as their assets,
since the governments have devoted public resources, such as funding, venues, and
talents, to the benefits of their local teams. Zhejiang Chouzhou Bank was one of the two
teams that did not engage in the club’s union led by Yao Ming. When asked why
Zhejiang would not join the reform, Fang Jun, General Manager of the club explained,
“The CBA is a state-owned property. Any change needs to go through complicated
processes. Our club is located in Zhejiang, an economically advanced province and a
progressive advocate in the national economic reforms. We must make any decision with
great caution.”101 The response seemed contradictory at one’s first glance, but the club’s
close relationship with the provincial government, indeed, gave its management little
incentive to change the status quo until the political leaders approves. According to the
club’s official website, the team was jointly owned by Zhejiang Professional Sports
Institute, a province-owned sports institute “overseen by Zhejiang Sport Bureau and
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instructed by Zhejiang Education Bureau,” and Zhejiang Chouzhou Bank, a local
commercial bank based in Yiwu, a county-level city with merely 1.2 million residents in
Central Zhejiang.102 The players and coaches on the team are primarily elevated from the
former Zhejiang Provincial Basketball Team, which has also been maintained with local
tax revenues. To reciprocate the Bank’s financial support, the government relocated the
team from the provincial capital, Hangzhou, to Yiwu. Since Yiwu itself has not been a
big market to generate ticketing and sponsorship revenues from, the team has become
more financially dependent on the government. In this example, the local government is a
stakeholder in both the basketball team and the Chouzhou Bank. By acting as a
middleman between the local sports franchises and financial institutions, Zhejiang’s local
officials have successfully enabled the team to continue its operations in the province,
hence continue to help beautify their performance with regards to economic growth and
social prestige.
In some rare cases, local governments are able to intervene even though the teams
have been completely privatized. In 2013, Wang Xingjiang, a billionnaire and former
team owner of Shanxi Zhongyu, decided to sell the team due to operating deficits.103
After having reached agreements with Beijing Enterprise (Beikong) and proceeded with
the federation and Beijing Sport Bureau, the Shanxi government started to obstruct.
Shanxi’s political leaders believed that the team should have stayed in Shanxi and be
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operated by a local enterprise.104 Eventually, Shanxi Fenjiu, a local state-owned
enterprise re-acquired the team from Beijing Enterprise with a 40 million yuan (USD
5.78 million) margin, and relocated the team back to Shanxi Province.105 Interestingly,
Shanxi’s Head of the Sport Bureau sobbed on the press conference, grateful for the
understanding of Beijing Enterprise, and of his counterparts in Beijing’s local
government.106
The examples of Beijing, Zhejiang, and Shanxi demonstrate that the primary goal
of local governments is to ensure that at least one CBA team, no matter what its
ownership structure is, remains in the locality. By either providing incentives or applying
administrative orders, local officials manage to hold the team and subsequently take
credit for economic benefits and political prestige that come along. However, the
alignment of these goals often lead to different thinking with regards to the privatization
of the league. Governments which believe league privatization can benefit their local
teams and economy tend to encourage their teams to take one step further, whereas
governments of smaller basketball markets often remain conservative about the reform.
Occasionally, local governments even interfere in the operations of private teams,
provided that such teams’ operation would affect local officials’ political standing.
Sport bureaucrats and local officials form the layer in between the center and the
private sector, regulating the daily operations of the league and influencing team
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decisions with political power. However, neither of the two middlemen is incentivized to
facilitate the market reform for which both the private sector and the central government
yearn. In order to change the status quo, the central government has to seek help from
outside the system to achieve its goal.

The Central Government:
Although many hold the belief that the Chinese ruling elites will counter the
private-sector-driven commercialization attempts, to defend their own interest, it is
precisely the central state that made the market reforms in basketball possible. In
Document 46, the government explicitly “encourages professional leagues,” and calls for
“improvements on professional sports clubs’ enterprise structure, transformation of
professional leagues’ decision making processes, and maximizes the leadership of the
clubs within the market.”107 These policies all apply well to basketball. Among the
different actors in the market, China’s central government is still the most powerful one
that can, to the greatest extent, determine to which direction the sector will advance.
Therefore, the central government’s decision to endorse the market forces has eventually
given a jumpstart to the basketball market reform after years of heated, yet fruitless
debate.
The private sector, and the state bureaucracy had long been maintaining a brittle
equilibrium in the power struggle, until the ruling elites recently became determined to
break the balance, in favor of the private sector. In January 2017, the new Head of the
GAS Gou Zhongwen issued “ten suggestions” that aimed to facilitate market reforms,
People’s Republic of China, State Council, Opinions on Accelerating the Development of the
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while keeping up the pace of administrative regulation. In his suggestions, Gou
particularly proposed that Yao Ming, the leader of the bottom-up revolutionary attempt to
privatize the CBA (league), should assume the post of the next President of the CBA
(federation) and the Head Coach of the Men’s National Team.108 He also pressured the
federation to release the business operation rights to the recently established CBA
Company, and encouraged infrastructure upgrades that would allow more diversified and
entertaining goods and services.109
Within a week after the distribution of the “suggestions”, the CBA (federation)
reversed Xin’s rejection of the reformists’ proposal, that only took effect less than one
year ago. Li Yingchuan, the Deputy Director of the GAS, declared on a press conference
of the Chinese Basketball Association (federation), that “We hope that the federation can
bravely initiate a revolution on itself, create new paths, unravel the interest conflicts
among different institutions, resolve the long-lasting issues of the entangled state and
society, state and private sector, and management and business operation.”110 The
federation also managed to reach a reconciliation with Yao Ming and other clubs owners
that participated in the revolution in 2016. Yao, who used to have concerns regarding the
conflicting interest between the roles of the president of the federation and ownership of
the Shanghai Sharks franchise, eventually decided to take this responsibility. Indeed, he
made the compromise by agreeing to sell the Shanghai Sharks that he currently owns.111

108

Leishi Jia, "Breaking: GAS Invites Yao Ming to Head up the CBA and National Team,"
Basketball Pioneer, January 2, 2017, http://sports.sina.com.cn/cba/2017-01-02/docifxzczfc6672392.shtml.
109
Ibid.
110
Jiayuan Fan, "Basketball Reformation: This Time, It's Real," People, January 10, 2017,
http://sports.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0110/c14820-29010241.html.
111
ErPai, "Yao Ming Has Transferred 30% of Shanghai's Shares. Local Government Hopes to
40

The state’s decision to select Yao was humiliating for the bureaucrats, who had
declined the club owners’ petition to reform the league less than a year ago. This decision
indicates that the ruling elites’ favors the privatization forces over the conservative
bureaucrats led by Xin Lancheng. Having represented the sports sector in the 12th
National Committee of the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference (CPCCC), Yao
had the opportunity to develop deeply-rooted connections with China’s political
leaders.112 Compared to the bureaucrats, Yao arguably has more access to the political
center, an advantage that has paved way for his transition to a political career. According
to NetEase, the GAS had informed Yao about its decision to appoint him prior to the
2016-2017 CBA season, and Yao has been preparing for his change of role ever since.
While having determined to facilitate general sports industry reform since 2014,
the central government has been rather patient with the basketball market. Most
reformative measures in basketball has come into effect since 2016, two years after the
Document No.46 was issued. Stability is one of the top considerations. The year of 2016
is an “Olympic year” to the Chinese government and public. Since the team sports’
performance in the Olympics can greatly influence public opinions, the state was also
more cautious about changes in these sports. While the zeal for Olympic gold medals
have gradually diminished in recent years, the elites would still not take any risk before
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the four-year Olympic cycle smoothly concludes.
The time frame also coincides with the leadership transition in the SGAS and
MCB. Gou Zhongwen, a technocrat who has led youth soccer development programs as
the Vice Party Secretary of Beijing and worked as Vice Ministry of China’s Information
Technology Industry, replaced Liu Peng and became the Head of GAS in 2016.113
Considering the central government’s dedication into “developing a new generation of
soccer players” since the inauguration of President Xi Jinping, Gou’s experience of
promoting grassroot soccer has greatly beautified his resume.114 Moreover, as the private
sector became increasingly well-connected with the center, some insiders from China’s
pyramid of political officials have lost trust from the political leaders, who now cherish
the alliance with influential political outsiders. Xin Lancheng, a professional bureaucrat
that had been dedicated to protecting the “state-owned basketball league” throughout his
career, was considered as a threat by the private forces. Ironically, his retirement was also
considered the best window to facilitate bolder reforms by the ruling elites.
While the examples of official appointment and time window of reform have
demonstrated the power of China’s central government when influencing the basketball
market reforms, the motives behind the push are also intriguing. In short, the state’s
market-oriented approach derives from its performance-based legitimacy, sensitivity to
public opinions, and intention to co-opt the outsider elites. Per the Opinions, the state
aims to “stimulate domestic consumption, boost employment, and foster new economic
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development,” as well as to “promote national spirit and facilitate national unity and
cultural competitiveness.”115 With the stagnation of China’s general economy, the
government hopes to release the business potential of China’s professional sports market,
particularly that of the popular team sports including basketball. The business successes
of CBA teams such as the Beijing Ducks and Guangdong Winnerway have further
convinced the officials of the market’s promising future. To encourage more investments
into the market, the center initiated many reformative measures, even if they may have
hurt interests of some political insiders.
In addition to economic considerations, another reason for the elites’
determination to reform is the rise of the public against the bureaucrats, who are often
associated with the totalitarian sports system. Prior to the 2016 Olympic Games, Xin
Lancheng had once become one of the least popular Chinese officials among the netizens
because of his bureaucratic work style and the condescending way he had treated Yao
Ming and the national team’s Head Coach, Gong Luming, both of which are popular
among Chinese sports fans and netizens. The transition from Xin to Yao parallels with
the central government’s hope to depart from the image of stiff Soviet-style political
machine to that of a new, progressive system that suits China’s unique circumstances.
The economic impact of the privatization of a sport on the general economy may be
minimal, but the social impact of the state’s initiative to promote reforms in this market
can be much more far-reaching.
Last but not least, China’s political elites have more and more realized the
significance of support from outside the political realm. With the rise of private
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enterprises, businessmen such as Wang Jianlin, Ma Yun, and even Yao Ming, have
increasingly become opinion leaders among the public, in addition to their personal
successes. Also, the business empires they have under control possess tremendous power
that can be dangerous if used against the regime. As a result, coopting these private sector
leaders is essential for the state to maintain political stability within the country. By
compromising with Yao and the other club owners’ request, the central state may risk
losing the loyalty of mid-level bureaucrats, but they will ultimately benefit from winning
the support of the now more crucial private sector.
In summary, China’s central state has, so far, been the only party that can
determine whether and when reforms can take place in the basketball market. The
arrangement and timing of the reforms reveal a great amount of influence exerted from
the ruling elites and the SGAS on recent transformation of the sport. By leading the
system into a more market-oriented direction, the authorities aim to boost sports economy,
diverge from association with the Soviet-style bureaucracy, and coopt leaders from
outside the regime.

Trends
Recent changes in China’s professional basketball market exhibit an advancing
private sector, a retreating bureaucracy, and a powerful authoritarian regime. While it
appears that the regime unilaterally accelerated the market reforms of basketball to a new
level, it is precisely the non-regime factors that pressed for this transformation for years.
With the declining popularity of the elite sports system and the state bureaucracy,
the ruling elites can only maintain their grip on power by invite the opposition to the
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decision-making process. In the basketball market reform, Yao Ming and other club
owners have played a much more crucial role than it appeared. Although the State
Council had announced its plan to promote sports economy since 2014, it would not have
challenged the status quo, or the existing power structure that favored the sports
bureaucracy, if the private players in the basketball market had not pressed for immediate
changes. In other words, the SGAS, agent of the central government on sports-related
issues, did not take the initiative to rebalance interests until it realized it was a necessary
compromise to retain the regime’s authority and the market’s stability. Ultimately,
sharing power with Yao is still more desirable than losing the trust and support from all
team owners, who at this point are arguably able to organize their own professional
league and write their own rules. Thus, the regime chose the least worst option, because
all other alternatives were considered even more devastating.
Generally speaking, the undergoing basketball market reforms, a result of the
long-lasting power struggle between the bureaucracy and the private sector, will benefit
China’s basketball market in the long run. By deregulating the operation of the league
and decentralizing related businesses, the hidden potential of sports media, event
operation, and sports sponsorship markets may eventually be realized.
However, the fact that the reform is not spontaneous but a result of cooptation is
concerning in three ways. First, while the new arrangement has extended power to nonpolitical forces, it has not increased transparency of the system. Yao had acknowledged
the elites’ decision to promote him well ahead of time, and was able to boost the team
and prepare for a resale in the market, but the rest of the CBA teams did not have access
to this information until the final decision was announced, not to mention the sponsors,
45

the media, and other stakeholders of the league. Ultimately, the decision-making power
in the market has become more inclusive only in the most minimal way. A necessary first
step, the reform is far from comprehensive.
Second, the privatization process itself may aggravate already existing problems
in the market. With more free competition yet unmatching regulative structure, regional
disparities may continue to rise. Compared to the OECD countries, China has outstanding
inequalities across regions, and the East has been significantly richer than the West. With
political forces involved, local governments and corporations in the West are at least
incentivized to invest in the market. However, if such preferential politics diminishes,
basketball may eventually become a game of the East Coast in China.
Third, it is urgent for the regime to appease the bureaucracy to avoid backlash
from within. The elites have wisely chosen a transitional period, in which the old
bureaucratic leaders have reached their retirement age, to launch the reform. However,
the integration of outsiders in the power sharing arrangement has sacrificed interest of the
younger bureaucrats. For example, Li Jinsheng, the former Deputy Director of the MCB
and the natural successor of Xin Lancheng, had to accept the office while acknowledging
Yao would be equal, if not superior, to him in the new arrangement. Other officials in the
MCB and the federation, who have been trained to maintain the current system, may find
their skill set useless and their existence undesirable to the new leadership.
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Chapter IV: Xi’s Soccer Dream
In an interview in 2016, Hao Haidong, one of China’s best players of all time and
an outspoken critic of the current system, told Renwu Magazine, “In the entire society,
there is no rule. No etiquette. We have soccer, but we do not have a soccer culture. It is a
minuscule of the society. Everything is interconnected.”116 Hao admitted he was one of
the beneficiaries of the system, but nevertheless mourned for its thousands of unheard
victims.117 Soccer was the first sport to have been through major reforms in China, but its
years of unsuccessful attempts at transformation have so far only brought despair and
frustration. With the inauguration of President Xi Jinping, an allegedly diehard soccer fan,
Chinese officials have once again set out to reform the soccer market and court the
supreme leader. However, this recently announced reform will recentralize the market
and largely reverse the progress that has been achieved in the past two decades.

History of China’s Soccer Reforms
As early as 1992 the CCP felt the urge to change its soccer system.118 After the
men’s national team lost to South Korea, which led to its failure in the qualification
games for the 1992 Barcelona Olympics, President Jiang Zemin sensed the widespread
public discontent and advised Sports Minister, Wu Shaozu, to provide a long-term
reformation plan for the sport.119 Within a year, the Chinese Football Association (CFA)
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called for a historical meeting in Red Mountain Valley, or hongshankou, and decided to
carry out professionalization and commercialization reforms at the request of Li Tieying,
a Politburo member in charge of sports.120 Wu later recalled in his book that Li advocated
for the league system and suggested that soccer should be able to become financially selfsufficient after the reform.121 Within two years, a two-division league system that
included Pro A and Pro B was established. Similar to the operation model of the
basketball market, the CFA sold the marketing rights of the entire league to the
International Management Group (IMG), and decided to distribute 80% of the revenue to
the teams, while retaining 20% for administration and youth and women’s soccer.122
Although the reform was successful in the beginning, with all participating teams
surviving on their own income by 1994, and profiting by 1999, it decayed very soon, as
the business became so lucrative, and the regulative measures so superficial, that massive
corruption and match-fixing became commonplace.123 From 1994 to 2009, the
involvement of teams, players, referees, and officials in bribery, corruption, gambling,
and match-fixing were the “hidden rules” of China’s soccer scene. While the sport
became financially independent, endless scandals and unsatisfactory national team
performances never ceased to deeply disturb the Chinese society. Although the CFA had
allegedly investigated dozens of scandals, most of the investigations were fruitless and
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only one referee was brought to court throughout the fifteen year investigation.124 The
chaotic situation did not come to an end until 2009, when former President Hu Jintao,
Vice President Xi Jinping and State Councilor Liu Yandong each delivered speeches on
the Party’s determination to crack down on corruption in the soccer market.125 Shortly
after the central government posted warning signs, the Ministry of Public Security
engaged in a thorough and independent investigation on the issue. By 2010, the police
had interrogated over a hundred individuals and arrested some of the most powerful ones
in the arena, including three high ranking officials of the CFA, Nan Yong, Xie Yalong
and Yang Yimin.126
Following the unprecedented anti-corruption campaign, the Chinese national team
did not improve in international contests as much as the society had expected, but the
private sector and sports fans did regain their confidence in the soccer market, because
the Party had hinted its devotion to the development of soccer. Since 2010, many
prominent businessmen have invested in soccer franchises in China and abroad, and Xi
even personally facilitated China Media Capital (CMC)’s acquisition of Manchester
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City.127 Moreover, Xi’s personal preference has encouraged the ruling elites to highlight
soccer in their state developmental plans for the future. Like in the first wave of sports
reforms in the 1990s, soccer is, once again, the pioneer of the current reforms, following
the announcement of Document 46. In 2015, the Central Leading Group for
Comprehensively Deepening Reforms (CLGCDR), a newly established Party apparatus
led directly by Xi Jinping, announced the General Reformation and Developmental Plans
for Soccer in China, among other reformative plans that were significant to the national
economy.128 Subsequently, in the same year, the State Council and its National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) included a 35-year roadmap for soccer
reforms in its Thirteenth Five-Year Plan.129 The Plan calls for “twenty thousand schools
with soccer specialty, the construction of over seventy-thousand soccer fields across the
country, and the establishment of a grassroot city league.”130
The progression of soccer in CCP’s China has had many twists and turns. The
first experiment of soccer reformation preceded all other sport reforms, and the initial
result – that the sport was able to support itself financially for the first time in China’s
sport history – was very satisfying for the state. However, the old Soviet-style
bureaucracy failed to evolve into a competent regulatory body for the newly developed
soccer market, and corruption issues haunted the sport for decades. In 2009 and 2010, the
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Ministry of Public Security eventually engaged in investigations of the soccer scandals in
the preceding fifteen years and cleared up the market after a large number of arrests. In
Xi’s era, the Party leader’s enthusiasm for soccer has become an open secret, and the
government has, therefore, issued long-term state-level plans to cultivate soccer talents of
future generations and disproportionately endorse soccer over any other sport. Xi went as
far as appointing Vice Premier Liu Yandong to directly organize and head up the Chinese
Soccer Reformation Team, with the participation of other high ranking officials in the
sports system.131

The State: A “Great Leap Forward” of Soccer
The recent reformation of China’s soccer market bears more resemblance to the
“Great Leap Forward” of the 1960s than to the earlier soccer market reforms in the 1990s.
Like the “Great Leap Forward,” the current reform is a top-down movement, in which the
central government, rather than the sports officials and local authorities who are better
informed on the issue, has the discretionary power to determine the budget for the
campaign and the results it needs to generate. Also, the scale of the reform has gone far
beyond the sports system – led by the Vice Premier of the state, the campaign has
involved the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance, the Development and
Reform Commission of the State Council, the State Administration of Press (SAP), the
General Administration of Sport (GAS), and the Chinese Communist Youth League
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(CYL).132 With the participation of all these governmental and Party branches, the effort
to facilitate changes in a specific sports market has easily escalated into a comprehensive
national movement. The market and the society have been politically sensitive, and
responded speedily to the signs indicating that the state favors soccer over other sports
and even key industries.
The goals of the soccer reformation are performance-based, distinct from those of
the general sports industry reform. According to the fifty pieces of policy advice provided
by the General Reformation and Developmental Plans for Soccer in China, the state will
execute a three-step strategy to boost China into a soccer superpower: the short-term
goals are to improve the general environment and management of the soccer market; the
mid-term goals are to “dramatically increase youth soccer population, to establish top
leagues and best teams in Asia, to make the men’s national team an elite team in Asia,
and to bring the women’s national team back to a first-class team in the world;” the
ultimate goals are “to establish top leagues in the world, to enthusiastically bid for the
FIFA Men’s World Cup, and to greatly raise the competitiveness of the men’s national
team to a world superpower.”133 While “facilitate[ing] market reforms in the soccer
industry” is one of the fifty policy suggestions in the document, the majority of the
document does not discuss consumption and the economic aspect of the reform.134
Besides, its advice with regards to the business operations of the league, free market
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competition in media rights negotiations, and private investments and sponsorships,
merely serves the purpose of “increasing funding.”135 By contrast, Document 46, which
addresses the entire sports industry, entails “facilitate[ing] sports consumption” in the
title, and as a key objective of the industry reform.136
In addition to the unique goals, the Party also looks to exert greater influence on
the development of the sport and divert more resources to the soccer market. First, the
previous soccer administration system has been restructured in a way which allows the
Party to oversee the sport more closely. According to the General Reformation and
Developmental Plans (the “Plans”), the CFA will become independent from the GAS.
Furthermore, the Management Center of Football (MCF), which essentially is the same
organization as the CFA, except that it is legally a subsidiary of the GAS, will be
disbanded.137 The new CFA is an “organizational legal person,” granted “power of selfdetermination on internal organization, work plans, financial and salary management,
human resource management, and international exchange.”138 However, the Plans also
emphasizes the importance of an “increasing leadership role of the Party,” demanding
that the CFA should establish a Party Committee and be incorporated into the Party’s
talent management system.139 Ironically, the Party Committee of the GAS will have
jurisdiction over the new CFA Party Committee.140 More importantly, Politburo member
and Vice Premier, Liu Yandong, has been appointed as Head of the Chinese Soccer
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Reformation Team, and Liu now directly supervises Cai Zhenhua, the President of the
CFA.141 In essence, the new organizational arrangement bypasses the SGAS leaders and
elevates the soccer programs to unprecedented political significance.
Second, government subsidies and favorable policies are pouring into soccer, to
the detriment of other sports, which will even affect the life of many individuals. One of
the most problematic policies in the Plans is “to prioritize soccer reformation and
development when arranging funding for sports and education.”142 In 2015, the
government spending on education was 2.7 trillion yuan (USD 391.3 billion), constituting
3.9% of the national GDP, lower by 0.5 percentage point than world average.143
Government spending on culture and sports was below 0.5% of the national GDP.144 By
financially promoting soccer development, the government will need to misappropriate
resources from the already underfunded, yet vital categories. Moreover, the document
suggests reducing the required scores for soccer players to enter colleges, and endorsing
elementary and middle schools that have “good foundation and high enthusiasm” in
bolstering soccer players.145 While sports and recreational activities are important to
school-aged children, the policy may disproportionately harm the most underprivileged
group, who are in dire need for all basic forms of education. It also benefits more well141
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equipped schools, because not many Chinese schools have had the space and resources to
build soccer fields. Land and environmental issues are also concerning. In order to have
more people play the sport, the Plans calls for the construction of more soccer fields.146
Article 36 requires the field construction to be a part of city and village planning, and
allows the utilization of “isolated lands, lands not in use, public parks, forests, roofs, and
civil air defense works.”147 Article 37 goes further and grants favorable policies in land,
tax deduction, and finance to private capital that shows interest in soccer field
construction.148 In recent years, land appropriation had already caused a large number of
discontent and land rights protests in rural China. Deforestation has led to climate change
and many incidents of landslides.149 Adding soccer field construction to local authorities’
bucket lists can only escalate the land rights tension and the environmental problems.
Moreover, opening up governmental subsidies to this program can only give rise to rentseeking behavior.
In short, the roadmap that the Party has drawn for soccer development
demonstrates that soccer is distinguished from all other sports in its political significance.
The state has essentially requested that the local authorities and the bureaucracy put aside
their more urgent responsibilities and to devote their resources to soccer reform.
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Although Document 46 is theoretically an overarching reformation guideline for all
sports markets, the soccer reform is unique, with regards to objectives and developmental
approaches. Politically, the sport is directly under the jurisdiction of the Politburo, the
State Council, and six state ministries and party apparatuses, which are all held
accountable for the success of the reform; economically, soccer is entitled to more
government subsidies and policy support than any other sport.

The Investors: A Spending Race
Acknowledging the importance of the political environment on the economy,
Chinese businessmen have reacted acutely to the “Great Leap Forward” in soccer. The
central government indicated the forthcoming changes in the arena five years before
Document 46 was released, and it has made clear what the political implications would be.
On October 12, 2009, former Vice President Xi Jinping asserted, “Since China can win
gold medals in other sports, we are also determined to improve our performance on
soccer,” when speaking with the Bayer Group on a visit to Germany.150 Two days later,
Politburo member and Former State Councilor Liu Yandong delivered a speech at the
annual national soccer conference, demonstrating that the three generations of Party
leadership all sincerely cared about the development of soccer, and that it was urgent to
find feasible approaches to soccer reformation and improvement.151 On October 16,
before the opening of the Eleventh National Games, former President Hu Jintao, again,
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addressed the issue on a meeting with legendary athletes and coaches, who have
contributed to sports development since the foundation of the PRC.152 Throughout the
first fifteen years of history of the Chinese professional leagues, none of the top Party
leaders had addressed the issue so publicly and intensely. Shortly after the speeches, the
Ministry of Public Security was invited into the scene, and the CFA officials, who had
been responsible for the previous investigations, were not allowed to participate. The
gesture made by the ruling elites was clear: the CCP was then determined, by all means,
to uproot the corrupt soccer system in its entirety.

The investors responded immediately to the three speeches, which marked the
beginning of China’s anti-corruption campaign. In March 2010, real estate oligarch Xu
Jiayin acquired the municipal soccer team, which had just descended into Pro B, for a
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hundred million yuan (USD 14 million).153 Xu renamed the franchise after his own
company, the Evergrande Group, and relentlessly threw money at China’s best soccer
players to recruit them to his team.154 While Xu’s decision was looked at with wide
skepticism, he soon proved himself to be perceptive. In 2014, Xu was able to sell fifty
percent of the club to Alibaba’s founder Ma Yun at 1.2 billion yuan (USD 194 million),
and the franchise became the first soccer club in Asia to file an IPO in 2015.155 Unlike Xu
and other soccer team owners, investors in most other sports were much more uncertain
about the prospect of the sports reform until 2014.
Chinese soccer investors are also more financially capable and ambitious than
their counterparts in other sports. According to Bloomberg, Chinese buyers have spent
over USD 2 billion in European soccer teams since 2015, and targets of acquisitions
include some of the most prestigious franchises, such as AC Milan, Inter Milan, Atletico
Madrid, and the Manchester City.156 Some of China’s most influential oligarchs, such as
Alibaba Group’s Ma Yun (Guangzhou Evergrande Taobao), Wanda Group’s Wang
Jianlin (Atletico Madrid), and Suning Group’s Zhang Jindong (Inter Milan), are all active
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players in the soccer spending race. Ma, Wang, Zhang, and Xu are all listed within top 10
of Hurun’s 2016 wealthiest people in China rankings.157 Comparatively, only one CBA
team owner, Sun Guangxin of the Xinjiang Guanghui Club, is ranked within top 100.158
The large wave of wealthy newcomers into the market has led to mixed results.
One of the most immediate is the increase in standards – the Chinese Super League has
easily become one of the highest paid leagues in the world, and money has attracted
world-class players and coaches. Data compiled by the Telegraph implies that in the one
year beginning from January 2016, “Jackson Martinez, Ramires, Oscar and Alex Teixeira
have all moved to the Chinese Super League (CSL) for a combined total of
£150million.”159 Prestigious coaches, such as Luiz Felipe Scolari, Sven-Goran Eriksson
and Marcello Lippi, have all had coaching experience with CSL teams in recent years.
The wealth has undoubtedly brought up the level of the CSL, but not for the national
team. Guangzhou Evergrande has won the championship of the AFC Champions League
twice since the 2009 speeches, and the last and only time when another Chinese team had
claimed the title was the Liaoning provincial team in 1990.
While the value of the league has been increasing since the anti-corruption
campaign, there has been a trend of overspending since the announcement of Document
46 and the General Reformation and Developmental Plans for Soccer. In 2016 and 2017,
CSL teams’ total expenditures on summer and winter transfers even exceeded the market
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value of all players in the entire league. The barrier to entry has become so high that only
oligarchs and large SOEs can afford to invest in the CSL. Moreover, SOEs’ involvement
in this spending race has resulted in losses of state assets. As of April 2017, Beijing
Zhonghe Guo’an, Shanghai Greenland Shenhua, Shanghai SIPG, Tianjin TEDA,
Shandong Luneng, and Changchun Yatai are owned by the SOEs and sponsored by the
local governments. While some of the SOE-sponsored clubs spend more deliberately,
others are only concerned with the championship and the prestige it can give to the SOE
leaders. In July 2016, Shandong Luneng acquired Graziano Pelle with £15.25 million
transfer fees and £260,000 weekly salaries, making the 31-year old forward one of the ten
highest soccer players in the world.160 However, according to Transfermarkt’s analysis,
Pelle’s market value was merely £8 million.161 Similarly, Shanghai SIPG has acquired
Brazilian guard Hulk at an Asian record of £46.1 million, and Shanghai Greenland SIPG
have acquired Demba Ba at a “possible record transfer fee.”162 Foreign agents and players
have been aware of the Chinese clubs’ willingness to spend, and the bold price tags are a
result of this reputation. Therefore, a large share of the fees and salaries that these state160
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sponsored clubs have paid using the controlling SOEs’ revenue benefits the agents, the
players, and their original clubs, at the cost of the SOEs and taxpayers. The SOE leaders
and the local authorities are the beneficiaries of these seemingly irrational purchases,
because a CSL championship or the AFC qualification can yield them prestige and
promotion opportunities. However, there exists no regulations to prevent them from
overspending on player acquisitions.
Just as match-fixing and corruption spread along with the last soccer market boom
in the 2000s, illegitimate capital outflow is finding loopholes in the current system. Since
2012, when the state eased its currency restrictions on direct foreign investments and
current account payments, capital outflows have been increasing every year, and the
central bank has been striving to stabilize the currency by imposing a currency exchange
cap on individuals and companies.163 In this situation, soccer becomes a natural channel
through which businesses can flush their capital abroad, despite the state’s foreign
currency quota. At the China Development Forum (CDF), Vice President of the People’s
Bank of China and Head of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Pan
Gongsheng, specifically warned soccer clubs and investors about their capital transfer
behaviors.164 While admitting some acquisitions have raised the standards of soccer
playing in China and the rest of the world, Pan points out that “Many companies already
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had a high debt ratio in China, but they were still borrowing to acquire [soccer clubs and
players overseas]; some even fabricate evidence of investments abroad, in order to
transfer their assets overseas.”165 In addition, the tremendous margin between marquee
players’ market value and the nominal transfer fees have created opportunities for money
laundering, particularly for club owners who have close relationships with the players’
agents.
Moreover, the intense championship competition within the top-tier league has
disincentivized the clubs to bolster their young talent. According to Chongqing Morning
Post, only 9% of the CSL clubs spend more than ten million yuan (USD 1.45 million) on
youth development, and only four clubs have the four-tier reserve system as required.166
The majority of the teams, meanwhile, devote less than four million yuan (USD 581,000)
to their youth programs.167 The fact that most CSL teams spend less on their player
development than on the transfer fee of any one marquee player reflects that most
investors perceive soccer as a short-term investment option. While the state can
supplement the current club programs with its nationwide soccer promotional campaigns
in schools and universities, it cannot immediately acquire sufficient coaching
professionals to bolster the youth soccer players and improve the quality of grassroot
soccer competitions.
Last but not least, the state’s favoritism toward soccer may discourage
investments in other sports markets. Before acquiring the Guangzhou soccer team, Xu
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Jiayin was originally in women’s volleyball, the only team ball sport in which China has
won Olympic gold medals. In 2009, Xu founded a Guangdong Evergrande Women’s
Volleyball team, acquiring many Chinese national team players and marquee foreign
players.168 This team was able to advance to the Pro A Volleyball League in its first year,
and won a runner-up and a championship in the following two seasons. However, with
the success of the Evergrande soccer team, Xu no longer needed the women’s volleyball
for advertising purposes, and eventually withdrew his investments from it.169 By 2014,
the Evergrande Volleyball Club had merged with the Guangdong provincial women’s
volleyball team, and most marquee players, whose salaries Xu would no longer be
willing to pay, returned to their original teams after an unsuccessful season.170 Women’s
volleyball is only one of the many sports in China that would have had a market potential
once professionalized, and Document 46 should have created the best window for the
reforms to take place. However, the state-level movement of soccer development has
delayed this opportunity for other professional leagues and players. While men’s soccer
currently underperforms among all China’s elite sports teams, the favorable policies and
the following gold rush in the market may eventually harm other sports, in which the
supreme leader has not indicated an interest.
Owing to China’s political system, China’s private sector is more sensitive to the
CCP’s gestures than most other corporate players in the world. Upon the message of the
state’s resolution to develop soccer, Chinese investors acutely sensed the opportunity and
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began massive investments in the soccer markets in both China and abroad. While the
increasing cash inflows have boosted the competitiveness of the CSL, it has also raised
concerns over loss of state assets, capital outflows, under-funded youth development
system, and uneven development across sports. These rash decisions by the private sector
have shown that many investors treat soccer teams as a short-term investments in their
portfolios, and this short-sightedness may create greater problems for the sport in the long
run.

Trends
Unlike how the Document 46 has dictated, most reformative measures that the
announced soccer reformation plan proposes focus on enhancing the performance of the
Chinese national teams, particularly the men’s team. The performance-based nature of
the reform illuminates that the state prioritizes Xi’s “three wishes” about soccer over
growth and financial independence of the sport. However, other actors may have different
goals in mind. Most private firms who have recently tapped into the soccer market either
regards the branding opportunity more valuable than its associated costs, or craves for
favorable policies from the local governments.
Since 1949, sports have had a high political significance to the Chinese ruling
elites, since the medal-winning strategy has helped the state demonstrate its superiority in
the world. However, the recent soccer reform marks a departure from this enduring soft
power strategy and emphasizes the cult of personality and diplomatic priorities. Since
2008, the state media has publicized Xi’s interest in soccer on many occasions. Prior to
the 2008 Olympic Games, Xi visited the venue of the Olympic soccer games and showed
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off his soccer skills on the Olympic soccer field.171 In 2011, he iterated in a meeting with
the leader of Korea Democratic Party, Sohn Hak-kyu, that “China entering the World
Cup, hosting a World Cup, and winning a World Cup” are my three wishes.”172 Since Xi
was inaugurated as the President of PRC in 2012, he has frequently mentioned his
enthusiasm for soccer in his visits abroad. According to People’s Daily, Xi expressed his
admiration of soccer star David Beckham in his visit to the U.S, played soccer in a
national visit to Ireland, and wished “both China and Indonesia be able to play in the
World Cup in the near future” before a visit to Indonesia.173 Xi also spoke about soccer in
an address with Congress of the Union of Mexico, a conversation with Dutch goalkeeper
Edwin van der Sar on the state banquet of Holland, and a meeting with Mauricio Macri,
former mayor of Buenos Aires.174
These remarks that Xi has made in public are, in some ways, reminiscent of the
“ping pong diplomacy” that China had facilitated in the 1970s. In both scenarios, the
government takes advantage of the universality of sports to strengthen diplomatic ties.
However, while the “ping pong diplomacy” set the foundation of the bilateral relations of
China and the U.S, the soccer diplomacy more often embellishes Xi’s personality.175 By
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frequently alleging he is a soccer fan and publicizing his experience as an amateur soccer
player, the propaganda has made the state’s top leader more relatable to the masses.
Moreover, Xi has address issues with soccer in a more personable way since he became
the President. When Xi served as the Vice President of the PRC, he encouraged the
women’s national team to “win glory for the country, the nation, and for your life.”176 In
his national visit to Germany, Xi said that “China has made a will” to bolster its soccer
performance.177 However, after 2012, Xi’s comments have had more individualism.
When visiting a group of young players in Germany, Xi encouraged them, saying “I have
high hopes of you. I believe that your generation will produce great soccer players. This
is my wish.”178 When accepting a Boca Juniors’ jersey from former Mayor of Buenos
Aires, Xi exhibits his sense of humor, asking “How much is the transfer fee?”179 The
personality cult, the portrayal of President Xi as a personable leader may increase the
popularity of him domestically and mitigate the hostile international environment to the
CCP regime.
Besides propaganda purposes, the specific policies of the soccer reformation
clearly indicate the state’s intention to fulfill Xi’s “three wishes” of Chinese soccer. Both
the General Reformation and Developmental Plans for Soccer in China and the Chinese
Soccer Developmental Plans in the Middle and Long Term in the Thirteenth Five Year
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Plan make it clear that the long-term goal of the policy change is to “build China into a
soccer superpower.”180 Moreover, among the fifty proposals in the Reformation and
Developmental Plans, only three touch on the operation of professional leagues and clubs,
which currently are the major component of the Chinese soccer market. Meanwhile, six
deliberate on the transformation of the CFA, seven on the expansion of soccer
competitions and international exchanges, twelve on the promotion of soccer and
sourcing of soccer talents in schools, universities, and the society, and five on the
improvement of the national teams.181 The Reformation and Developmental Plans also
strongly calls for policy and financial support in ten of its proposals.182 Rather than
encouraging the development of the professional leagues and therefore boosting growth
from the market, these measures aim to foster a future soccer superpower, based on better
regulation, more quality competition, larger talent pool, and greater support toward the
sport from the state and the society. Although some of these reforms may drive growth in
the market indeed, it will only be a bonus of the state’s initiative. Ultimately, these
documents imply that the strongest incentive for the state to transform the sport is to meet
Xi’s expectations of Chinese soccer, in addition to embellish the top leader’s image in
both China and abroad.
While the state is driven by political objectives, the private sector that has been
invested fervently in the market recently will only contribute to the development funds
for substantial benefits. Wanda Group’s Wang Jianlin, also China’s wealthiest man,
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entered the soccer market twice for different purposes. In the early 1990s, Wang signed a
sponsorship contract with the sports administration of Dalian to sponsor the municipal
soccer team, in exchange for the right to establish a building near the city’s stadium.183
Although his project was rejected by the municipal government, Wang sensed that the
city and its government had love for soccer, and he decided to execute the sponsorship
contract and soon became its major investor.184 The Dalian Wanda Club did become the
trademark of the city, and Wang, who had only owned a small real estate company
previously, was able to obtain tremendous benefits from this investment – the
government offered him more favorable policy for his real estate business, and he was
able to establish ties with the political elites, including the former Sports Minister Wu
Shaozu and former Dalian’s Mayor Bo Xilai.185 However, when Wang believed that Bo
had intervened in the operation of his club, and that the Chinese soccer market had
deteriorated intensely, he quitted soccer in the late 1990s.186
After the anti-corruption campaign in 2009, Wang, once again, realized the
potential of the soccer market, and entered with even greater vision. In 2011, Wanda
signed a partnership deal with the CFA, “comprehensively endorsing” the Chinese soccer
resurrection plans.187 In an interview, Wang declared that “the reason why Wanda would
sponsor the cause of China’s soccer development is firstly the indication from the state,
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the society, and the central leaders, and secondly my own passion for the sport.”188 Loyal
to the state, Wang also actively seeks policy support for his extensive business empire. In
the keynote speech of the Caixin Summit in 2016, Wang claimed that the sports industry
needs to “integrate with business, media, tourism, and urban development,” which
coincides with Wanda’s businesses in sporting event operation, Internet, hotel and resort
chains, and real estate.189 Wang also urged the state to build more sports infrastructure,
arguing “if we cannot construct enough soccer fields, we cannot develop soccer.”190 With
Wang’s experience in sports, real estate, and entertainment complex, Wanda can take
over soccer field construction projects stressed by the state in its various documents, as
long as the local governments approve these projects and grant him the land he
requests.191
Indeed, other private firms have already been facilitating the soccer construction
business. In January 2017, Hebei CFLD, the investor of the Hebei CFLD FC and a real
estate firm rooted in the Hebei Province, announced a partnership deal with the Hebei
Football Association (HFA).192 The deal not only allows the CFLD to promote soccer in
local schools, but also grants it a piece of land in Gu’an, on which CFLD will build “a
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large soccer complex which includes bases for the professional team and its reserves.”193
Similarly, the Guangzhou municipal government has decided to invest in a world-class
stadium to host the Guangzhou Evergrande, and yielded business operation rights of the
publicly funded Yuexiushan Stadium to the city’s other club, Guangzhou R&F.194 In
addition, the government was willing to “assist R&F in transforming the University
Town’s Sports Center to R&F’s training base, and to coordinate with R&F in establishing
a municipal youth training center.”195 Since the CFLD, Evergrande, and R&F are all real
estate firms, they have benefited from the reform by gathering more land, which has
become extremely scarce and expensive in today’s China.
Compared to the basketball market, in which the bureaucracy has been impeding
the reform for years, officials in the soccer system have had much less power, but their
self-interest are more aligned with those of the state – that is, to bolster the performance
of the national team. The state’s anti-corruption campaign between 2009 and 2010
arrested some of the most powerful individuals in the sport, including three high rank
officials of the CFA.196 With the removal of Nan Yong, Xie Yalong, and Yang Yimin,
there had emerged a power vacuum in the administration, and their successors, Wei Di
and Cai Zhenhua, never gained as much influence as the three. Since Cai was selected as
the new CFA President in 2014, he has enunciated his determination to improve the
national team’s performance on different occasions. In March 2014, when discussing Xi
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Jinping’s expectations on soccer, Cai asserted that “we have formulated a ten-year plan
for the CFA, and will strive to rebuild China into a top Asian team within ten years.”197
Six months later, after a loss of the national U23 team in the Asian Cup, Cai angrily told
the reporters that “Chinese soccer cannot develop with slogans – it has a long way to go.
Please stay patient with us. Just wait and see. There will be many reforms.”198 In January
2017, two years after the reform plans were announced, Cai took a step back from his
previous statements, arguing that performance should not be the only standard to evaluate
the soccer reform.199 Despite this claim, he nevertheless justified for the national team’s
losses by filling in more performance-based data. According to Cai, the FIFA ranking of
the men’s national team had improved, and the women’s team has, once again, became a
Top 8 team in the world.200
In the current soccer market reform, President Xi himself and the state are the
dominant actors, and they treat the reform as not only a way to fulfill Xi’s wishes, but a
cult of personality of the leader both domestically and internationally. The private
investors, while having misaligned goals with the state, ride with the reform by taking
advantage of the soccer-related policy support from the local governments. The current
soccer bureaucracy has only been formed recently, because the anti-corruption campaign
had eliminated the old elites in this market, and they have the same set of goals with the
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state. Generally speaking, the soccer reform entails less self-contradiction than that of the
basketball market, because there exist less number of actors in the market, and the state
monopolizes power in this field.

Conclusion
Soccer reform has taken a distinct path from basketball and many other sports.
With the endorsement of the state, the sport has enjoyed considerable political and
financial support from the public sector. The reformative policies prioritize the national
team’s performance and impose tight political control over the sport. President Xi Jinping
has played a significant role in this policy change, because the designated policies reflect
his personal preference, and he has devoted himself to guiding the direction of this
reform. The private investors have played a minor role, but nevertheless benefited from
the reform as they secured land, funds, and ties from respective local governments. In
general, the soccer reformation has been more consistent than the basketball reform,
because there has not been as much conflicting interest. However, the benefits of this
reform will be limited to a smaller number of political and business elites, and the current
growth in the market may vanish quickly.

72

Chapter V: Discussion
In the two case studies, the Chinese central state has a greater impact on the
soccer reform, but it serves as the key actor who has jumpstarted both reforms. In the
basketball market, the role of the state, though crucial, is secondary to the private firms:
investors had deliberated on and pushed for the reformation for years, but did not manage
to penetrate the bureaucracy until the state removed the barrier for them. By appointing
Yao Ming to succeed Xin Lancheng, the state conveyed the message that it would take
sides with the market forces, rather than continue to rely on the state apparatuses and
reinforce the outdated system. Endorsed by the central state, the investors of the
basketball market will be able to lead the reform, and eventually deregulate and privatize
the sport. By contrast, the government has been the dominant force in the soccer reform,
since it initiated the anti-corruption campaign, organized a well-staffed unit to lead the
transition, and enforced its reformative policies on both federal and local levels. The
investors are interested in the market, only because they capture the state’s determination,
and comprehend the importance of it to their business environment. Ultimately, the
state’s actions will most likely reverse the past reforms in the soccer market. The sport
will see more centralization and enjoy more policy favors in the coming years.
The discrepancy between the state’s actions in the two markets derives from the
different goals the CCP has for the two sports. The ruling elites have allowed the private
sector to transform professional basketball as they see fit, because they have realized that
defending the bureaucrats and the old system will only further alienate the public. As
early as 2009 the sarcastic couplet – “Thanks to God, thanks to Earth, and thanks to
Yalong (xietian xiedi Xie Yalong); faith in deity, faith in ghost, and faith in Lancheng
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(xinshen xingui Xin Lancheng)” – had become popular among Chinese netizens.201 While
the verses target at the former heads of the soccer and basketball administration, their
popularity suggests the critical attitude of Chinese society toward the entire sports
bureaucracy. As Xie Yalong and his colleagues at the CFA had already been removed
after the anti-corruption campaign in 2009, the state, in the current reform, moved on to
weaken the basketball federation and bolster the private firms, to which the federation
had been opposed. Meanwhile, the soccer reform bears the tasks to please President Xi
Jinping and to provide justification for his leadership. By imposing those favorable
policies to soccer, the CCP can also strengthen its regime. President Xi, a passionate
soccer fan, has publicized his wishes for the Chinese national team, and the reformative
policies are tailored to his performance-based vision for the sport. The political aspect of
the soccer reform is also important. Xi’s passion is translated into a personality cult and a
diplomatic message for both domestic and international audience.
Notwithstanding the diverging paths, the motivation for the state to facilitate both
reforms has been consistent. Since the “reform and opening up” policy, the CCP has been
able to lie on China’s persistent economic growth, which justifies the “Socialism with
Chinese characteristics” that it embraces. However, as the national economy slows down
in the past few years, it is vital for the CCP to either reinvigorate the economy, or identify
a new source of legitimacy. The state’s decision to initiate reforms in the sports sector
incorporates both elements. First, Document 46 sets a specific bar for the sports economy
to reach – that is, the market shall reach 5 trillion yuan by 2025, even though the current
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size of the industry is merely 386.4 billion yuan.202 Unrealistic as this expectation seems,
the state has determined to reshape sport, from a political tool that demonstrates China’s
superiority, into an economic sector that can drive sustainable growth. The rationale
behind the expectation of the state is the rapid growth of China’s service industry, and the
general belief is that service industry growth is the last resort of China’s stagnating
economy.203 According to the Financial Times, “a broad category that includes healthcare,
education, entertainment and culture, science and research, business services and utilities
– fully 20 per cent of the economy,” now sees the fastest growth among all categories.204
Sports not only falls into this category, but it is one of the only sub-sectors that have not
been fully deregulated, yet having the capacity. Moreover, boosting the sports industry
does not lead to any negative moral implications. While China has opened up to private
schools and health providers in recent years, it is not sensible to expect long-term growth
from these sectors, because public goods cannot be valued solely by economic terms.
Second, the CCP can gain popularity by accommodating to the new social norms,
which interpret sports differently. As discussed in Chapter I, the market-oriented Western
sports model has, over the years, increasingly resonated among the Chinese masses. The
totalitarian elite sports system, on the contrary, has gradually lost its appeal. With the
unprecedented economic success over the past thirty years, the Chinese society no longer
see the need to demonstrate the nation’s strength internationally, but now demand more
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modernization within the political system. While discussions on democracy and
criticisms against the government are still systematically repressed, the CCP now tends to
allow skepticisms toward the state’s bureaucracy. Sometimes, it even plays scapegoating
if needed. In fact, as Professor Martin King Whyte points out, “for China’s rulers today,
as in the past, bureaucracy is often seen as ‘a problem.’”205 In the sports sector,
specifically, the fans and netizens are more likely to blame the direct leader of an
administration, for the failure and scandals of this sport, rather than hold the regime’s
ruling elites accountable. As a result, the unpleasant connotations of bureaucracy does not
undermine the regime, and the Party is willing to crack down on its institutions, in order
to enhance its image. In practice, directors of the management centers of sports,
particularly the Management Center of Football (MCF) are frequently removed upon
failures to meet the public’s expectations of the respective sport. However, members of
the central government, such as officials in the General Administration of Sports (GAS),
hardly take responsibilities for China’s overall unsatisfactory performance and failure to
facilitate desirable reforms.206
Third, the wide media coverage on President Xi’s passion for sports, particularly
for soccer, is engineered. Unlike his predecessor Hu Jintao, Xi frequently exhibits his
vivid personality and even his private life to the public. It suggests a more individualbased propaganda approach, which aims to justify the leadership of Xi just as much, if
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not more, than that of the CCP.207 Xi’s public appearances on soccer fields and
unpretentious remarks on issues concerning Chinese soccer demonstrate his good health
and likeable character. By publicizing Xi’s soccer-related activities, the CCP can appeal
to the millions of sports fans in the country. This personality cult can only be more
effective if combined with specific reformative plans. By representing Xi as a disturbed
person on China’s corrupt sports scene, and an effective leader that is willing to make a
difference, the state can put all the blames on the incompetent bureaucrats and credit the
central government.
The state’s reasoning behind the sports industry reform also sheds light on the
guiding principle of China’s political elites. In today’s China, the authorities rule on the
basis of performance-based and political legitimacy. According to Seymour Lipset, the
stability of a democratic system depends on the “system’s efficiency in modernization,”
which entails economic development, and “effectiveness and legitimacy of the political
system,” which often refers to electoral democracy. 208 While China is not democratic, the
same requisites apply, and failure to meet such standards will risk crises of change.209
Since the country’s economic modernization, the CCP regime’s performance-based
legitimacy has already been widely discussed, but its political legitimacy come less under
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the spotlight.210 However, this paper proposes an alternative argument – that is, the sports
industry reform is an attempt by the state to obtain political legitimacy. It essentially
rejects the assumption that the authority of the CCP regime cannot be legitimate, since it
is not derived from consent.211
In fact, with the economic reform and rapid growth coming to an end, the CCP
has frequently resorted to political strategies to expand its base of legitimacy. The recent
anti-corruption campaign within the political system is an example of such attempt to
strengthen the CCP’s authority by attacking the flaws of the regime and those who “make
up the regime.”212 In the sports industry, similarly, the state has recognized the defects of
the totalitarian system (juguo tizhi) and the necessity to disintegrate the bureaucracy that
has been holding it together. Although neither of the policy changes goes so far as to
challenge the institutional underpinnings of the power abuses, they have both helped
legitimize the regime. While it is often believed that only electoral democracy can deliver
political legitimacy, research reveals that quality of the government is as crucial. 213 By
cutting back the power of its sports bureaucracy, the CCP may be able to establish a more
transparent and effective organizational structure in the sector, which translates into good
governance.
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Moreover, reformation in the sports sector enjoys better publicity than that in
other industries. For decades, sport has not only been embraced by the state as a
propaganda tool, but also perceived by the masses as a channel to unleash their patriotism
and nationalism. Victor Cha argues that “sport acts as an outlet for releasing pent-up
historical resentments in ways that cannot be expressed through regular diplomacy.”214 In
July 2001, when Beijing won the bid for the 2008 Olympic Games, tens of millions
people celebrated all over the country, millions celebrated in Beijing, and more than four
hundred thousand went on a self-started parade on the Tiananmen Square.215 In the same
year, a group of a hundred thousand gathered at the city center of Dalian, to march for
China’s first appearance in the World Cup.216 In short, sport appeals to an enormous
population, and entails a lot of national pride, in CCP’s China.
This population became a natural audience for the regime’s political legitimation,
when the CCP initiated changes that have been long expected in the sports sector.
According to Francis Fukuyama, it is necessary for the state “to be perceived as being
legitimate by the underlying society” to establish legitimacy.217 As the social perception
of sport has evolved from a showcase of the national strength to a subcategory of the
entertainment industry and an approach to a healthy life, the state also adapts its guiding
ideology to meet the society’s new expectations. Because this reformation that is targeted
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at the totalitarian system has a larger audience than most other post-communist reforms,
it is also more effective in expanding the regime’s political legitimacy.
Despite the CCP’s effort to restore legitimacy and sustain the regime, the sports
industry reform is also exposed to political risks. First, the elite sports system has been
too entrenched in the political machine and the Chinese society to be easily dissolved.
The sports bureaucracy not only constitutes the CFA and the CBA, but also 37 local sport
bureaus, 31 Olympic sports associations, 41 non-Olympic sports associations, hundreds
of research institutes, and thousands of sports schools and institutes.218 The apparatuses
of this system employs up to hundreds of thousands of individuals. While a delay in the
reform will impede the market from achieving its full potential, dissolving and
restructuring this monstrous system may also incur discontent and instability from the
society.
Also, the privilege that soccer enjoys in the reform indicates that China’s political
system has become more dictatorial and less consensus-based within the Party since Xi
assumed office. Although the recentralization of the soccer market does not intend to
affect other sports and aspects of social life, it contradicts the goals of the industry reform,
and may lead to negative consequences, such as unbalanced development across sports,
environmental degradation, education inequalities, and gender inequalities. It is
disturbing that the vision Xi has had for China’s national soccer team has overshadowed
the more deliberative industry policies devised by the more well-informed officials.
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Furthermore, while many of China’s political leaders are passionate about sports, none of
Xi’s predecessors had launched state-level reforms for their personal interests.219
While the two sports examined in the case studies have taken distinctive paths
since 2014, the ultimate goal for the state to facilitate changes in both sectors is to restore
and expand its legitimacy. The sports industry reform is composed of economic and
political elements, which can fulfill the CCP’s long-lasting performance-based legitimacy,
and respond the public’s demand for political modernization, respectively. Moreover, the
reformation in the sports sector is well-publicized because of historical and social factors,
and can therefore influence the society more effectively. Despite all the benefits, the
reforms are still vulnerable to political risks, namely the transitional cost and the
unpredictability of dictatorial system.
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Chapter VI: Conclusion
To conclude, China’s sports industry reform since the 2010s is a state-led effort
that aims to restore and strengthen legitimacy of the CCP regime. In the basketball
market, the state has allowed the private sector to lead the privatization reform that it has
been pressing for years. In the soccer market, by contrast, the state has re-centralized the
resources and distributed them in a way that will most likely fulfill President Xi’s vision
for the development of the sport. While each sub-sector may take a unique approach to
the transformation process, the guiding principles of the state have been consistent. With
the recent economic slowdown, the regime hopes to tap the potential of the sports
economy, which can serve as a new source of growth, and to dissolve its elite sports
system, which now has a connotation of totalitarianism and backwardness within the
public. By facilitating this campaign, the CCP will be able to reinforce its political
authority, with enhanced economic performance and modernized bureaucracy.
Although this study attempts to give an overview of each actor in the playmaking
of the current reform, it mostly focuses on the state actors and primarily analyzes the
regime’s incentives. In practice, large corporations, the press, and other non-state actors
also play substantial roles to the reformation. Methodologically, this research lacks
firsthand accounts of the reform from political insiders. Future studies with a holistic
approach and more primary sources may alleviate these limitations.
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